Meanings, Policies, and Medicine: On the Bioethical Enterprise and History by Rosenberg, Charles E.
 




(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Rosenberg, Charles E. 1999. Meanings, policies, and medicine: On the
bioethical enterprise and history. Daedalus 128(4): 2746.
Published Version http://www.jstor.org/stable/20027587
Accessed February 18, 2015 8:38:46 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4730333
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAACharles  E.  Rosenberg 
Meanings,  Policies,  and Medicine: 
On  the Bioethical  Enterprise  and History 
One  can  hardly  ignore  the widely  shared  conviction  that 
we  are  living  through  a  period  of  crisis  in  health  care. 
And  that  crisis  is more  than  economic  and  administra 
tive,  though  its most  egregious  symptoms  present  themselves  in 
these  interrelated  forms.  One  need  only  pick  up  a  newspaper  or 
magazine  to  be  reminded  of  the  omnipresent  and  multidimen 
sional  nature  of  the  problems  confronting  American  medicine. 
Many  of  those  perceived  dilemmas  turn  on  rapid  technical 
change  and  the  difficulty  of  creating  an  institutional  and  eco 
nomic,  as  well  as  moral,  context  in which  these  new  clinical, 
policy,  and  research  options  can  be  managed.  Not  surprisingly, 
bioethics  is  often  invoked?as  both  symptom  and  possible  rem 
edy?in  discussions  of  these  jarring  realities.  How  are  we  to 
think  about  this  enterprise,  site  it  in  social  space,  and  under 
stand  its  several  interrelated  identities?  These  are  not  easy 
tasks.  Contemporary  bioethics  constitutes  a  particularly  elu 
sive  challenge  for  the  historian;  value  assumptions  have  always 
shaped  medicine  as  a  social  enterprise,  yet  those  values  have 
been  often  implicit  and  unspoken,  the  moral  common  sense  of 
each  generation  interacting  with  technical,  professional,  insti 
tutional,  and  economic  factors  to  configure  a  time-specific  set 
of  clinical  realities. 
Charles  E.  Rosenberg  is  Janice  and  Julian  Bers  Professor  in  the  department  of  the 
history  and  sociology  of  science  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania. 
17 28  Charles  E. Rosenberg 
MEDICAL  CARE  AND  SOCIAL  OBLIGATION 
For  this  historian  of  American  medicine,  some  of  the  markers  of 
contemporary  change  are  particularly  striking.  The  New  York 
Times,  for  example,  reported  in  1998  that  Montefiore  Hospital 
had  announced  its  intention  of  entering  into  a  joint  venture  with 
a  for-profit  corporation;  it  planned  to  open  a  chain  of  24-hour 
cancer  and  HIV  clinics.  "The  No.  1  problem  for  not-for-profit 
institutions,"  the  president  of Montefiore  explained,  "is  capital 
formation."1  In  my  own  city,  Philadelphia,  the  Pennsylvania 
Hospital,  America's  oldest  general  hospital,  first  sold  its  histori 
cally  important  psychiatric  division  to  a  for-profit  provider, 
then  sold  itself,  after  an  independent  existence  of  a  quarter  of 
a millenium,  to  a  rather  more  youthful  entity  called  the  Univer 
sity  of  Pennsylvania  Health  System,  which  announced  its  plans 
to  send  four  "experts  in  'clinical  reengineering'  to  look  for ways 
to  make  cost-effective  changes  in  clinical  care"  at  its  new 
acquisition.2  The  Hospital  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 
had  just  finished  its  own  "reengineering."  Even  more  recently, 
the  Philadelphia  region's  health-care  system  has  been  destabi 
lized  and  demoralized  by  the  aggressive  takeover  strategy  of  a 
Pittsburgh-based  health-care  system,  which  purchased  physi 
cian  practices,  hospitals,  and  associated  medical  schools  in  a 
bold  marketplace  venture  that  soon  ended  in  bankruptcy,  unmet 
commitments,  and  a  perilous  future  for  such  historically  signifi 
cant  institutions  as Hahnemann  Medical  College  and  the Medi 
cal  College  of  Pennsylvania.3 
Particularly  revealing  among  my  collection  of  recent  media 
indicators  is  an  ironic?and  enlightening?juxtaposition  of  sto 
ries  on  the  front  page  of  the  New  York  Times.4  In  the  upper 
right-hand  corner  was  a  report  that  National  Institutes  of  Health 
(NIH)  funding was  likely  to be  increased  in next  year's  budget. 
And,  it was  explained,  cancer  could  be  understood  and  treated. 
"We  are  in  a  golden  age  of  discovery,"  the  director  of  the 
National  Cancer  Institute  (NCI)  contended,  "one  unique  in 
human  history.  .  .  . 
Knowledge  about  the  fundamental  nature 
of  cancer  is exploding."  Basic  science  was  closing  in on  mankind's 
ancient  enemy,  and  relentless  Washington  lobbying  could  be 
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interested  parties?patient  advocacy  groups,  doctors,  and  medical 
schools?had  joined  in  supporting  an  effort  to  double  the  NIH 
budget  over  the  next  five  years.  "We  plan  a  grass-roots  cam 
paign  inside  and  outside  the  Beltway,"  the  president  of  their 
lobbying  firm  explained  candidly:  "It will  be  run  the  same way 
Northrop  Grumman  lobbies  for  the  B-2  bomber."  Immediately 
to  the  left  of  this  upbeat  and  uninflected  report  of  promised 
laboratory  achievement  was  a  background  story  on  the  emo 
tional  and  physical  pain  associated  with  the multiple  births 
resulting  from  contemporary  fertility  treatments:  "Joy  and  Sor 
row  follow  Medical  Miracle"  read  one  of  the  subtitles  in  this 
sobering  overview.5  Whether  the  placement  of  these  stories  on 
the  front  page  of  the  Times  was  a  compositor's  whim  or  an 
implicit  editorial  comment,  the message  seems  undeniable.  Tech 
nology,  market  incentives,  and  public  policy  have  changed  and 
are  changing  every  aspect  of  medical  care,  while  society  has 
been  less  than  successful  in  anticipating  the  consequences  of 
such  change. 
The  Fall  1998  special  issue of Life,  to cite  a  related  example, 
was  devoted  to  "Medical  Miracles  for  the  Next  Millennium." 
The  cover  promised  "21  Breakthroughs  That  Could  Change 
Your  Life  in the  21st  Century:  Gene  Therapy/Edible  Vaccines/ 
Memory  Drugs/Grow-Your-Own  Organs."  Little  attention  was 
paid  in  the magazine's  worshipful  depiction  of  laboratory  progress 
to  the  ironic  and  seemingly  paradoxical  growth  of  a  wide 
spread  fear  of  that  technology's  human  implications.  Similarly 
illuminating  was  an  issue  of  Time  on  "The  Future  of Medicine." 
The  subtitle  promised  to  explain  "how  genetic  engineering  will 
change  us  in  the  next  century."  The  striking  cover  illustration 
was  a  stylized  caduceus,  a  snake's  head  morphing  into  a  coil  of 
DNA.6  How  better  to  symbolize  medicine's  changing  and  con 
flicted  shape  in  a world  of  relentless  laboratory  progress  and 
media-heightened  public  expectations?  The  cover's  powerful 
visual  metaphor  represents  as  well  two  seemingly  inconsistent 
yet  mutually  constitutive  aspects  of  contemporary  medicine: 
the  technical  and  the  sacred?the  cultural  power  of  laboratory 
novelty  and  the  persistence  of  a  self-conscious  ethical  tradition. 
I would  argue  that  this  brief  sampling  of  media  reports  pro 
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cosm.  It  illustrates  not  only  a  perceived  crisis  in  public  policy, 
but  a  fundamental  inconsistency  between  values  and  expecta 
tions,  as well  as  the  concrete  social  and  economic  relationships 
in which  such  convictions  and  perceptions  are  necessarily  em 
bedded. 
Our  health-care  system  is marked  by  a  characteristic  discon 
nect:  on  the  one  hand,  boundless  faith  in  the  power  of  the 
laboratory  and  the  market,  on  the  other  a  failure  to  anticipate 
and  respond  to  the  human  implications  of  technical  and  institu 
tional  innovation.  And  this  dilemma  grows  directly  out  of  our 
expansive  faith  in  technical  solutions  to  clinical  problems;  as we 
are  well  aware,  sickness,  pain,  disability,  and  death  are  not 
always  amenable  to  clinical  intervention.  In  the  late  twentieth 
century,  such  conflicts  are  both  public-policy  issues  and,  inevi 
tably,  elements  in  individual  doctor-patient  relationships.  The 
question,  of  course,  is  relating  the  particular  to  the  general, 
understanding  the  choices  that  face  individuals  in  recurring 
social  interactions?in  some  sense  weighing  and  understanding 
degrees  of  individual  autonomy,  of  professional  and  collective 
social  obligation.  I would  contend  that  bioethics  must  ulti 
mately  address  such  questions  and  issues  that  are  necessarily 
historical  and  unavoidably  moral:  the  move  from  the  individual 
to  the  social,  from  meaning  to  structure  in  terms  of  medicine, 
from  the  clinical  encounter  to  the  larger  society  in which  that 
encounter  takes  place. 
MEDICINE  AND  MEANINGS 
To  a  historian,  many  of  the  dilemmas  that  beset  contemporary 
medicine  are  strikingly  different  from  parallel  realities  in  pre 
vious  American  generations.  The  world  of  social  value,  and 
thus  obligation,  was  very  different,  for  example,  when  the 
Montefiore  Home  for  Chronic  Invalids  opened  its  doors  in 
1884,  and  certainly  when  the  Pennsylvania  Hospital  was  estab 
lished  in  the  1750s.  Pious  and  paternalistic  activism,  the  ex 
change  of  care  for  deference,  were  as  central  to  the  eighteenth 
and  early  nineteenth-century  hospital  as  monetary  exchange 
was  alien  to  it.  Class  and  dependence  as  much  as  diagnosis 
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in  the  home,  and  in which  institutional  care  was  limited  essen 
tially  to  the  urban  poor.7  In  fact,  the  late-twentieth-century 
term  "health-care  system,"  with  its  assumption  of  a  complex, 
multilayered,  bureaucratic,  interactive,  and,  by  implication, 
public  world  of  medicine,  is  irrelevant  to  an  era  without  special 
ists  and  laboratories,  an  era  in  which  the  great  majority  of 
medical  care  was  performed  in  the  patient's  home,  whether  by 
family  members  or  professional  physicians.  The  worthy  poor 
were  presumed  to  deserve  voluntary  hospital  care  without  in 
curring  the  stigma  that  came  with  almshouse  admission.  Physi 
cians  were  presumed  to  have  an  obligation  to  provide  gratu 
itous  or  discounted  care  to  those  unable  to  afford  their  fees. 
Whether  rural  or  urban,  nineteenth-century  Americans  were 
presumed  to  have  a  right  to  such  care,  but  not,  of  course,  to 
equal?class-blind?care. 
The  public  sector  played  a  role  in  the  provision  of  health 
care,  but  only  in  regard  to  the  dependent,  not  to  those  seen  as 
able  to  care  for  themselves.  A  socially  constructed  sense  of 
stewardship,  of  categorical  moral  obligation,  motivated  and 
shaped  the  efforts  of  our  earliest  hospitals'  founders.  They  did 
not  expect  to  be  judged  primarily  by  the  success  or  failure  of 
marketplace  decisions  (though  they  were  expected  to  function 
responsibly  within  the  market).  The  medical  profession  was 
presumed,  at  least  in  theory,  to  be  motivated  by  a  code  of 
gentlemanly  and  selfless  benevolence;  patenting  discoveries? 
like  advertising  one's  clinical  services?was,  for  example,  seen 
as  evidence  of  sordid  quackery,  not  rational  market  behavior. 
Economic  competition  was  understood  to  be  not  a  guarantor  of 
economically  efficient  health  care  but  an  ever-present  motiva 
tion  for  misrepresentation  and  shoddy  practice. 
In  1800,  medical  ideas  and  medical  practice  were  widely 
distributed  throughout  society?in  patterns  vastly  different  from 
those  to  which  we  have  become  accustomed  in  the  late  twenti 
eth  century.  Conventional  moral  values  suffused  both  lay  and 
professional  ideas  of  disease  causation  and  treatment,  for  ex 
ample,  but  were  not  legitimated  in  terms  of  modern  notions  of 
specific,  mechanism-defined  disease.  Disease  categories  did  not, 
logically  enough,  play  so  prominent  a  role  in  lay  understand 
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appropriate  therapeutic  and  diagnostic  choices.  Homosexual 
behavior  was  a  willed  act  of  immorality,  for  example,  not  a 
disease,  personality  type,  or  merely  one  among  a  variety  of 
lifestyle  patterns;  disruptive  grammar-school  children  were 
wicked  and  undisciplined,  not  victims  of  Attention  Deficit  Hy 
peractivity  Disorder.  Death  involved  prognosis  and  pain,  con 
frontation  with  a  patient's  spiritual  and  aggregate  physiologi 
cal  status,  not  the  management  of  machines  and  the  hegemony 
of  bureaucratic  protocols  and  insurance  schemes.  Euthanasia 
meant  literally  that?an  easy  death?and  implied  the  deploy 
ment  of  opiates,  moral  reflection,  and  family,  not  respirators 
and  advanced  directives.8  Research  had  not  yet  come  to  em 
body  a  transcendence  rivaling  that  of  traditional  religion  and 
community  obligation. 
There  are,  of  course,  continuities  as  well  as  contrasts  be 
tween  the  late  eighteenth  and  the  late  twentieth  centuries. 
Chronic  disease,  for  example,  posed  questions  of  behavior, 
volition,  and  regimen?just  as  today's  anxieties  about  risk  fac 
tors  and  lifestyle  mobilize  feelings  of  guilt  and  accountability.9 
And  men  and  women  felt  pain,  feared  death,  mourned  the  loss 
of  loved  ones?as  they  still  do. 
My  argument  will  have  become  clear  enough  by  now.  I have 
tried  to  illustrate  in  concrete  terms  the  way  in which  morality 
and  moralism,  obligation  and  responsibility  are  unavoidable 
elements  of  medical  care,  and  at  the  same  time  contingent  and 
historical.  Medical  ideas  and  practices  have  always  reflected, 
incorporated,  and  sanctioned  prevailing  notions  of  value  and 
responsibility.  Such  ethical  assumptions  imply  priorities  and 
constrain  choice;  meaning  and  morality  are  thus  necessarily 
and  inextricably  embedded  in  every  aspect  of  medical  practice: 
private  and  public,  individual  and  collective. 
NOVEL  REALITIES 
If  anything  can  be  said  to  characterize  our  particular  moment 
in  the  relationships  among  the  linked  histories  of  medicine, 
culture,  and  public  policy,  it  is,  as  I have  emphasized,  a  novel 
sense  of  change  and  conflict,  an  uncomfortable  awareness  of 
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cal,  the  individual  and  the  collective,  in  configuring  the  rights 
of  physicians,  individual  patients,  and  the  general  good.  It was, 
in  fact,  out  of  such  perceived  conflict  that  bioethics  itself  devel 
oped  as  a  self-conscious  movement  in  the  1960s  and  early 
1970s.  Its  very  creation  was  in  part  a  symptom?as  well  as  a 
recognition?of  perceived  inequity,  of  a  gap  between  medicine's 
presumably  sacred  and  humane  tradition  and  a  reality  often 
egregiously  inconsistent.  It was  an  acknowledgment  that  some 
thing  needed  to  be  done.10 
In  another  sense,  this  gap  between  medicine's  humane  tradi 
tion  and  a  more  complex  and  compromising  reality  can  be 
thought  of  as  a  structured  crisis  in  supply  and  demand:  a 
demand  constituted  by  pain  and  anxiety  and  the  inexorable 
realities  of  demography  and  chronic  disease,  yet  routinely  con 
strued  in  terms  of  procedures  and  specialists.11  Americans  have 
produced  a  reservoir  of  insatiable  clinical  demand  ill-suited  to 
a world  of  supply  dominated  by  technology,  by  impersonal? 
and  costly?providers  and  products. 
This  asymmetry  embodies  a  structured  conflict  that  a minor 
ity  of  far-sighted  social  scientists  and  physicians  have  warned 
about  since  the  progressive  era  at  the  beginning  of  the  present 
century,  when  such  critics  deplored  a  growing  medical  imper 
sonality  and  dependence  on  what  they  already  saw  as  increas 
ingly  pervasive  technology.  Such  anxieties  might,  in  fact,  be 
seen  as  precursors  of  the  late-twentieth-century  bioethics  move 
ment?an  affirmation  of  the  individual  and  the  idiosyncratic  as 
opposed  to  the  depersonalization  and  fragmentation  of  care 
implied  by  clinical  pathology,  specialism,  and  reductionist  un 
derstandings  of  health  and  disease.  We  have  experienced  a 
century  of  recurrent  crisis  in  how  we  think  about  medicine  and 
what  we  expect  from  it. We  seem  to  have  created  a  system  in 
which  material  expectations  are  bound  to  disappoint,  and  in 
which  we  increasingly  and  paradoxically  keep  trying  to  reach 
personal  (that  is,  intangible,  experiential,  and  holistic)  ends, 
through  technical  and  mechanism-oriented?reductionist? 
means. 
Another  recent  bit  of  media  evidence  illustrates  this  point 
more  concretely.  Newsweek  recently  featured  an  article  on  the 
genetic  causation  not  only  of  clinically  well-defined  mental 34  Charles  E. Rosenberg 
illness  but  also  of  a  bewildering  variety  of  human  peculiarities, 
all  construed  as  less  severe  manifestations  (shadow  ailments 
caused  by  the  presence  of  one  or  more  "abnormal"  genes)  of  a 
multi-genic  illness.12  "Idiosyncratic  behaviors  and  personality 
quirks  once  thought  merely  'odd'  or  'interesting'  might  be,  in  a 
sense,  mental  illnesses,"  the  Newsweek  reporter  explained,  "a 
reflection  of  an  abnormality  in  the  brain,  and  even  in  the 
genes." 
Though  perhaps  at  first  thought  unrelated  to  the  previously 
mentioned  changes  in  such  historically  significant  institutions 
as  Montefiore  and  the  Pennsylvania  Hospital,  or  to  under 
standing  the  social  place  of  bioethics,  this  newsmagazine  story 
illustrates  a  fundamental  and  in  fact  logically  related  aspect  of 
twentieth-century  medicine:  its  characteristic  search  for  mecha 
nism-based  understandings  of  an  ever  wider  range  of  human 
behaviors.  This  relentless  medicalization  of  both  normal  and 
deviant  behavior  sheds  a  parallel  and  supplementary  light  on  a 
fundamental  structural  reality  in  our  health-care  system:  the 
tendency  to  ask  medicine  to  do  more  and  more  cultural  work, 
while  demanding  that  this  cultural work  be  legitimated  in terms 
of  biological  mechanism.  It  is  in  part  a  crisis?as  illustrated  in 
the  Newsweek  story  on  the  genetic  determination  of  practically 
everything?of  how  we  legitimate  norms,  manage  deviance, 
think  about  ourselves.  Behavior,  agency,  culture  itself  can  be 
ingenuously  reduced  to  neurochemical  mechanisms,  even  if  this 
determinism  continues  to  dismay  those  anxious  to  maintain  a 
place  for  human  agency  and  individual  responsibility. 
This  structure  of  linked  ideas  and  institutional  relationships 
poses  a  number  of  problems  for  both  historian  and  bioethicist. 
Perhaps  most  fundamental  is  the  way  in which  ideas,  values, 
and  expectations  become  embedded  in  institutions,  in practices, 
and  in  economic  relationships  and  interests.  Second  is  the  way 
in which  the  concepts  and  practices  of  medicine  have  become 
increasingly  central  to  the  everyday  lives  of  men  and  women, 
metastasizing  on  to  the  business  and  editorial  as  well  as  the 
news  pages;  we  seem  well  on  the  way  to  medicalizing  not  just 
deviance,  but  almost  every  aspect  of  daily  life.  Third  is  the  way 
in  which  medicine  is  simultaneously  within  and  outside  the 
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tional  question:  Can  the  market  (as  mediated  through  public 
advocacy  and  the  political  process)  prove  adequate  as  a means 
of  distributing  clinical  equities  and  outputs,  when  demand  is 
defined  in more  than  material  terms?  Can  the  market  produce 
rational  and  rationalized  (collective)  solutions  that  must  be 
experienced  in moral  and  emotional  (individual)  terms? 
The  bottom  line,  as  I  have  tried  to  emphasize,  is  that  we 
cannot  remove  or  isolate  value  assumptions  from  the  institu 
tional,  the  technical,  and  the  conceptual  in medicine;  men  and 
women  inevitably  express  their  sense  of  need  and  priority  in  the 
public  sphere. Medicine  is negotiated  and  inevitably  political, 
and,  as  we  have  come  to  understand  more  generally,  the  politi 
cal  is  cultural.  The  heated  contemporary  debate  surrounding 
managed  care  illustrates  in  a  very  concrete  way  the  nature  of 
such  interconnections  between  values  and  interests.  Questions 
that  can  be  framed  as  matters  of  justice  and  autonomy  are  at 
once  questions  of  control  and  economic  gain.  Perceptions  of 
right  and  wrong,  of  appropriate  standards  of  practice,  consti 
tute  de  facto  political  realities?variables  in  negotiating  choices 
among  rival  policies  as  well  as  in  particular  clinical  interac 
tions.  The  widespread  assumption,  for  example,  that  it  is  right 
for  government  to  play  a  role  in  providing  and  regulating 
health  care  is  a  specific  historical  and  ethical,  and  thus  political, 
reality.  And  so  is  the  equally  pervasive  assumption  that  it  is 
somehow  immoral  for  mere  economic  calculation  to  constrain 
a  physician's  clinical  decision  making.  Our  willingness,  in  fact, 
to  nurture  bioethics  similarly  constitutes  a  public  recognition  of 
medicine's  special  moral  identity. 
But  this  vague  moral  consensus  cannot  mandate  a  precise 
and  unambiguous  social  agenda  for  bioethics.  The  new  enter 
prise  has  been  charged  with  a difficult  and  elusive  job.  We  live 
in  a  fragmented  yet  interconnected  world,  a world  of  ideologi 
cal  and  social  diversity,  of  inconsistency  and  inequity,  of  change 
and  inertia.  We  cannot  discuss  relationships  among  men  and 
women  who  differ  in  power  and  knowledge  without  acknowl 
edging  those  inequities:  class,  geography,  gender,  race,  and 
education  all  modify  the  category  patient;  economic  incentives 
as  well  as  the  institutional  and  intellectual  structures  of  medi 
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the  category  physician.  A  growing  awareness  of  such  com 
plexities  has  made  bioethics  an  increasingly  labile  and  self 
conscious  enterprise.  And  perhaps  a  less  self-confident  one  as 
well:  articulating  and  applying  a  foundational  ethical  basis  for 
particular  social  actions  no  longer  seems  an  easily  attainable 
goal. 
Inconsistent  ideas  as  well  as  social  diversity  shape  available 
choices  for  both  physician  and  patient.  Our  society  has  elabo 
rated  and  internalized  not  a  unified  and  coherent  moral  consen 
sus,  but  rather  a world  of  medical  discourse  and  practice  marked 
by  the  claims  of  three  competing  and  not  always  consistent 
transcendences.  One  is  the  academic  research  tradition  with  its 
worship  of  the  selfless  search  for  knowledge  and  a widespread 
faith  in  its  inevitable  application.  It  is  a  kind  of  secular 
millennialism,  powerful  not  simply  because  it  is  a  source  of 
undifferentiated  cultural  optimism,  but  because  it  is  structured 
into  the  expectations  and  hopes  of  individuals:  into  the  career 
choices  of  particular  physicians  and  scientists,  into  the  forma 
tion  of  public  policy,  and  into  the  status  and  programs  of 
academic  departments  and  teaching  hospitals.13  Second,  and 
more  recent,  is  the  worship  of  system  as  goal  and  ideal,  the 
assumption  that  the  optimum  general  good  is  attainable  only 
through  an  optimum  configuration  of  market  and  institutional 
relationships.  Finally,  of  course,  is  the  traditional  moral 
specialness  of  medicine,  respect  for  physician  responsibility  and 
the  rights  of  individual  patients?a  tradition  that  can  be  traced 
from  classical  antiquity  to  contemporary  debates  over  medical 
care.  Each  of  these  claims  to  transcendence  legitimates  claims 
to  social  authority;  all  are  ceaselessly  configured  and  reconfigured 
as medicine's  technical  resources  and  institutional  forms  evolve 
and  pose  novel  research  and  clinical  options.  Bioethics  has  in 
fact  already  become  a  substantive  actor  in  the  complex  interac 
tions  that  characterize  relations  among  these  realms  of  value 
and  implicit  power. 
I have  tried  in  the  preceding  pages  to  illustrate  a  number  of 
the  ways  in which  the  moral  values  that  suffuse  medicine  are 
historically  constructed  and  situationally  negotiated,  like  every 
other  aspect  of  culture,  and  not  simply  derived  from  the  formal 
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and moral  philosophy  (though  such delineations  of  fundamental 
principle  are  in  themselves  an  element  in  the  social  negotiations 
that  inform  and  rationalize  health  care).  The  formulations  of 
credentialed  philosophers  and  theologians  are  at  once  a  claim 
to  cultural  authority  and  a  factor  in  the  public  mediation  of 
social  conflict. 
BIOETHICS  AS  HISTORICAL  SUBJECT 
The  very  existence  of  a  socially  visible  enterprise  called  bioeth 
ics  is  a  recognition  of  the  recurrent  structured  conflicts  I have 
tried  to  illustrate  anecdotally.  Thus,  I  began  this  discussion 
with  particular  examples  of  institutional  change  because  I  wanted 
to  emphasize  the  ways  in which  the  history  of  bioethics  under 
lines  medicine's  context  dependence,  and,  in  particular,  the  way 
in which  medicine  necessarily  embodies  a  variety  of  attitudinal 
and  value  elements  as  well  as  technical  capacity  and  institu 
tional  practice. 
But  this  is only  one  of  the ways  in  which  bioethics  and history 
relate.  First,  from  the  historian's  disciplinary  perspective,  bio 
ethics  is  a  complex  and  potentially  revealing  subject  for  empiri 
cal  investigation.  Second,  and  more  important,  I  would  contend 
that  although  academic  history  and  bioethics  have  in  general 
followed  separate  paths,  they  share  a  potential  community  of 
sensibility,  a  sensitivity  to  context  and  to  the  relationships 
among  individual  perception,  social  constraint,  and  the 
situatedness  of  human  agency.  Practitioners  of  history  and 
bioethics  should,  finally,  be  similarly  aware  of  the  importance 
of  irony  and  contingency,  of  the  gap  between  theory  and  prac 
tice,  conscious  intent  and  unforeseeable  outcome. 
The  still-brief  history  of  American  bioethics  demonstrates 
just  such  realities.  As  a  social  movement,  bioethics  developed  in 
the  mid-twentieth  century  as  a  critical  enterprise,  a  response  to 
felt  inhumanities  in  our  system  of  health  care  and  biom?dical 
research.  A  response  to  specific  abuses,  bioethics  has  remained 
practice-oriented;  society  expects  bioethics  to  solve  or  at  least 
ameliorate  insistently  visible  problems. 
Growing  as  it  has  out  of  a  sense  of  moral  outrage,  bioethics 
has  had  an  undeniable  impact  on  everyday  clinical  realities.  Yet 3 8  Charles  E. Rosenberg 
from  the  historian's  perspective,  this  novel  enterprise  has  played 
a  complex  and  in  some  ways  ambiguous  role.  Bioethics  not  only 
questioned  authority;  it  has  in  the  past  quarter-century  helped 
constitute  and  legitimate  it.  As  a  condition  of  its  acceptance, 
bioethics  has  taken  up  residence  in  the  belly  of  the medical 
whale;  although  thinking  of  itself  as  still  autonomous,  the  bio 
ethical  enterprise  has  developed  a  complex  and  symbiotic  rela 
tionship  with  this  host  organism.  Bioethics  is no  longer  (if  it 
ever  was)  a  free-floating,  oppositional,  and  socially  critical 
reform  movement:  it  is  embodied  in  chairs  and  centers,  in  an 
abundant  technical  literature,  in  institutional  review  boards 
and  consent  forms,  in  presidential  commissions  and  research 
protocols.  It  can,  that  is,  be  seen  as  a mediating  element  in  a 
complex  and  highly  bureaucratic  system  that  must,  neverthe 
less,  manage  ceaseless  technical  change.  It  is  not  an  accident 
that  the  bioethical  enterprise  has  routinely  linked  bureaucracy? 
committees,  institutional  regulations,  and  finely  tuned  language? 
with  claims  to  moral  stature. 
But  this  functional  role  implies  a  structured  conflict.  By  in 
voking  and  representing  medicine's  humane  and  benevolent, 
even  sacred,  cultural  identity,  bioethics  serves  ironically  to 
moderate,  and  thus  manage  and  perpetuate,  a  system  often  in 
conflict  with  that  idealized  identity.  In  this  sense,  principled 
criticism  of  the  health-care  system  serves  the  purpose  of  system 
maintenance.  It  is  such  paradoxes  of  power  and  consciousness 
that  explain  why  bioethics  needs  to  think  of  itself  both  histori 
cally  and  politically.  And  in  some  ways  this  process  has  already 
begun.14  Bioethics  has  already  enshrined  its  heroes  and  vil 
lains?Henry  Beecher  and  Josef  Mengele?and  commemorated 
its  sacred  places?Willowbrook,  Tuskegee,  Nuremberg.  In  fact, 
one  could  argue  that  the  historical  stock-taking  initiated  by 
bioethics'  founding  generation  is  itself  an  aspect  of  what  might 
be  called  institutional  consolidation.15 
Participant  histories  serve  celebratory  and  mystifying  as  well 
as  analytical  and  self-critical  ends.  History  can  be  used  to 
demonstrate  both  false  consciousness  and  a  celebration  of  con 
science.  It  is  difficult  for  the  committed  practitioner  not  to 
emphasize  her  field's  positive  values  and  accomplishments,  not 
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against  the  routine  and  unself-conscious  abuse  of  men  and 
women  in  everyday  clinical  and  research  settings.  It  is  equally 
difficult  to  see  the  apparatus  of  committees  and  regulations  that 
protect  patient  rights  against  the  abuses  of  an  impersonal  tech 
nology  as  itself  a  technology.  By  way  of  example,  let me  quote 
the  words  of  a  bioethicist  reacting  to  an  earlier  version  of  my 
present  remarks,  and  in  particular  to  a  passage  in  which  I 
described  the  bioethical  enterprise  as  in  some  ways  a  technol 
ogy  necessarily  mirroring  the  technology  it  sought  to  amelio 
rate.  "Bioethics,"  the  indignant  reader  explained,  "in  the  late 
twentieth  century  in  American  medicine  has  always  champi 
oned  the  rights  of  the  individual  patient  against  the  vagaries  of 
the  medical  system.  Its  cardinal  principles  of  autonomy,  benefi 
cence,  non-maleficence,  and  justice  represent  the  antithesis  of 
technology."16 
Most  contemporaries  would  not  be  quite  so  uncritical  in  their 
self-evaluation,  yet  are  still  ill-prepared  to  deal  with  what  I 
have  characterized  as  the  central  irony  of  bioethical  success: 
insofar  as  it  has  been  accepted  by  the  world  of  research  and 
clinical  practice,  it  has  become  a  part  of  those  linked  enter 
prises,  and  thus  its  every  criticism  and  consequent  procedural 
reform  cannot  help  but  constitute  an  aspect  of  biomedicine's 
public  moral  face. 
As  a  specific  empirical  subject,  moreover,  bioethics  presents 
an  elusive  aspect?as  elusive  as  weighing  its  ultimate  social 
impact.  In  part  this  is  because  the  bioethical  enterprise  is  an 
aggregate  of  three  not-always-consistent  activities.  One  is  the 
elaboration  of  formal  doctrine,  the  job  of  individuals  trained  to 
articulate  and  address  normative  ethical  questions.  I  refer,  of 
course,  to  those  philosophers  and  theologians  who  have  sought 
to  create  a  principled  consensus  around  such  policy-defining 
issues  as  autonomy,  beneficence,  and  justice.  Second  is  the  role 
of  bioethics  in mediating  day-to-day  clinical  problems  in  par 
ticular  social  settings.  I have  in mind  the  innumerable  contexts 
in which  institutional  review  boards,  government  commissions, 
and  the  language  and  ritual  of  informed  consent  make  practi 
tioners  and  researchers  aware  of  the  rights  of  patients  and 
subjects.  Third  is  the way  in which  the  bioethical  enterprise 
figures  in  public  discourse,  responding  in  newspapers,  periodi 40  Charles  E. Rosenberg 
cals,  television,  and?in  recent  years?the  Internet  to  novel 
dilemmas  derived  often,  but  not  always,  from  technological 
innovation.  In  this  public  capacity  bioethics  reassures,  implying 
that  there  is  a  discernible  moral  order  that  can  be  used  ratio 
nally  to  manage  new  and  potentially  alarming  clinical  and 
research  choices.  It  is  both  ritual  and  spectacle,  acting  out  the 
several  reassurances  of  ethical  concern,  credentialed  expertise, 
and  the  assumption  that  fundamental  ethical  principles  can  be 
discerned  and  applied. 
Thus  bioethics  occupies  three  distinct  (if often  overlapping) 
social  spaces.  One  is  academic,  formal,  discipline-  and  text 
oriented.  A  second  is  the  hospital  and  research  settings,  where 
bioethics  has  an  institutionalized  presence.  Third,  as  I  have 
suggested,  is  the  media/This  mosaic  of  roles  and  sites  of  social 
action  makes  bioethics  both  complex  in  structure  and  difficult 
to  delineate.  This  diversity  of  site,  personnel,  and  function  also 
explains  my  avoidance  of  the  term  "discipline"  in  describing 
what  I  have  chosen  to  call  instead  the  bioethical  enterprise:  a 
conglomerate  of  experts,  practices,  and  ritualized  and  critical 
discourse  in  both  academic  and  public  space. 
BIOETHICS  AND  THE  HISTORICAL  SENSIBILITY 
I  have  specified  a  number  of  ways  in  which  bioethics  and 
history  might  share  an  analytic  perspective.  First,  and  perhaps 
most  fundamentally,  I would  argue,  the  task  of  ethical  under 
standing  should  parallel  the  historian's  job  of  cultural  recon 
struction:  both  kinds  of  practitioners  should  seek?if  necessar 
ily  imperfectly?to  understand  a  time-  and  place-specific  struc 
ture  of  choices  as  perceived  by  particular  actors.  Second,  I 
would  argue  that  we  cannot  understand  the  structure  of  medi 
cal  choice  without  an  understanding  of  the  specific  histories  of 
medicine  and  society  that  have  created  those  choices.  This  was 
the  argument  I  hoped  to  illustrate  in my  earlier  recounting  of 
change  in  contemporary  American  hospitals  and  my  emphasis 
on  increasingly  reductionist  understandings  of  disease.  And 
third,  and  perhaps  most  disquieting,  we  must  historicize  bioeth 
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relationships  to  the  special  world  of  medicine  and  to  the  larger 
society  in which  medicine  is nurtured  and which  medicine  in 
part  constitutes. 
My  first  point,  which  seems  no  more  than  a  truism  to  a 
cultural  historian,  will  seem  irrelevant  or  perhaps  even  philis 
tine  to  scholars  focused  on  the  elucidation  of  ethical  principles 
abstracted  from  precise  social  and  institutional  contexts?even 
if motivated  by  abuses  at  just  such  specific  sites.  Moreover, 
such  formal  styles  of  normative  discourse  parallel  and  intensify 
the  historical  tradition  of  medical  ethics  with  its  emphasis  on 
the  unmediated  doctor-patient  dyad:  one  doctor,  one  patient, 
one  bedside,  the  paradigmatic  vexed  case.  From  the  contextu 
ally  oriented  historian's  point  of  view,  however,  choice  is  al 
ways  constrained  and  structured,  a  reality  to  be  understood  in 
specific  situations,  not  schematically  in  terms  of  logically  and 
morally  coherent  ends.  In  this  historical  and  sociological  sense, 
autonomy  is  a  product,  not  a  goal;  it  is  a  place-,  time-,  and 
system-specific  outcome  of  the  interaction  between  the  micro 
cosm  of  the  clinical  encounter  and  the  macrocosm(s)  of  the 
larger  society  and  the  cognitive  and  institutional  world  of  medi 
cine.  This  needs  hardly  be  elaborated  at  a moment  in  time  when 
many  physicians  find  their  clinical  interactions  limited  by  man 
aged  care  providers  to  fifteen  minutes  and  their  diagnostic  and 
therapeutic  choices  limited  as  well.  Autonomy  and  agency  are 
constructed  and  reconstructed  in  every  healing  context.  There 
can  be  no  decontextualized  understanding  of  bioethical  dilem 
mas;  bioethics  is  definitionally  contextual,  as  I  have  argued, 
finding  its  origins  in  the  search  for  particular  solutions  to  visible 
social  problems.  A  decontextualized  approach  in  bioethics  is 
not  simply  a matter  of  disciplinary  style;  it  is  a  political  act. 
Discussions  of  informed  consent,  for  example,  that  abstract 
the  actors?clinicians,  researchers,  patients,  and  "subjects"? 
from  their  particular  social  roles  and  individual  identities  are 
not  very  helpful  and  must  in  fact  mystify  these  social  relation 
ships,  and,  in doing  so,  legitimate  the  de  facto  authority  of  those 
individuals  and  institutions  doing  the  "consenting."17  At  the 
risk  of  seeming  didactic,  let me  take  a moment  to  underline  the 
way  in which  the  colloquial  use  of  "consent"  as  a  verb  illumi 
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"autonomy"  and  "beneficence."  This  usage  is  a  syntactical 
representation  of  power  and  comparative  powerlessness,  of 
actor  and  the  object  of  that  actor's  actions.  To  consent  a  patient 
is  to  act  out?and  legitimate?a  reality  of  social  inequality  as 
well  as  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  a  self-conscious  commu 
nity  of  "consenters"  well  aware  of  the  ritual  and  hierarchical 
aspect  of  this  now  pervasive  ethical  mechanism. 
I  would  argue,  moreover,  that  bioethics  is not  only  defined  by 
its  context  of  use  but  that  it  cannot  be  self-aware  without  an 
understanding  of  the  history  of  medicine  in  the  past  century:  of 
the  roles  played  by  new  and  specific  notions  of  disease,  by  the 
growth  of  specialism  and  credentialing,  by  the  siting  of  the 
clinical  encounter  in  a  technologically  rationalized  and  struc 
tured  institution  instead  of  the  individual  home  or  physician's 
office.  This  point  hardly  needs  elaboration.  Bioethics  is,  or 
should  be,  a  social  and  a  historical  enterprise,  for  the  issues  it 
seeks  to  mediate  are  themselves  the  products  of  a  specific, 
determining  history.  Without  history,  ethnography,  and  poli 
tics,  bioethics  cannot  situate  the  moral  dilemmas  it  chooses  to 
elucidate.  It  becomes  a  self-absorbed  technology,  mirroring  and 
inevitably  legitimating  that  self-absorbed  and  all-consuming 
technology  it  seeks  to  order  and  understand. 
But,  as  I have  suggested,  it  is  easier  to  call  programmatically 
for  bioethics  to  place  itself  and  its  tasks  historically  than  to 
accomplish  that  task.  There  is  no  simple  path  to  understanding 
the  historical  place  of  bioethics  but  rather  a  variety  of  interpre 
tive  options,  reflecting  the  interpreter's  point  of  view  and  the 
inherent  elusiveness  of  the  subject.  The  enterprise  elicits  a 
diversity  of  perspectives.  To  some  critics  on  the  Left,  bioethics 
is  no  more  than  a  kind  of  hegemonic  graphite  sprayed  into  the 
relentless  gears  of  bureaucratic  medicine  so  as  to  quiet  the 
offending  sounds  of  human  pain.  Its  ethical  positions,  this  argu 
ment  maintains,  are,  in  terms  of  social  function,  no  more  than 
a way  of  allaying  social  and  legal  criticism,  and  are  merely  the 
self-reproaches  of  a  minority  of  ethically-oriented  physicians. 
Bioethics  has,  moreover,  according  to  this  position,  focused  too 
narrowly  on  the  visible  problematic  instance?on  the  plug  pulled 
or  not  pulled,  on  the  organism  cloned  or  the  cloning  inter 
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policy  debates  and mundane  bedside  dilemmas.  And,  finally, 
these  critics  contend,  it  is  not  surprising  that  in  a  bureaucratic 
society  we  have  created  a  cadre  of  experts  and  a  body  of 
knowledge  to  provide  a  soothing  measure  of  humanity,  certi 
fied  and  routinized. 
To  its  sophisticated  practitioners  and  advocates,  on  the  other 
hand,  bioethics  is  a  humane  change  agent,  an  important  mecha 
nism  for  mediating  technological  and  institutional  change,  a 
kind  of  software  that  facilitates  the  adaptation  of  novel  variet 
ies  of  hardware.  It  is,  the  argument  states,  a  genuine  constraint, 
a  substantive  actor  in  a  complex  renegotiation  of  everyday 
medical  practice;  bioethics  has,  similarly,  influenced  the  con 
duct  of  clinical  research  with  human  and  animal  subjects.  One 
need  only  point  to  the  creation  of  research  guidelines  for  human 
and  animal  subjects,  to  the  existence  of  institutional  review 
boards,  and  to  good-faith  attempts  to make  informed  consent  a 
reality.  Even  if  an  unfettered  individual  autonomy  may  be  an 
unrealizable  ideal,  the  assumption  nevertheless  that  there  is 
such  a  thing  contributes  to  a  viable  framework  for  thinking 
about  transcendent  value,  constitutes  in  itself  a  resource  in  the 
complex  negotiations  that  determine  and  constrain  individual 
and  institutional  choice.  Bioethics  has  also  played  a  construc 
tive  role  in  the  public  discourse  surrounding  clinical  medicine 
and  biom?dical  innovation,  a media  discourse  that  is  necessar 
ily  focused  on  particular  problems  as  spectacle  yet  in  such 
perception-altering  acts  changes  our  structure  of  political  choice.18 
Perhaps  most  important,  bioethics  expresses  the  widely  felt 
social?and  thus  political?assumption  that  medicine  is  and 
must  be  more  than  a  sum  of  technical  procedures  and  market 
transactions.  It  promises  solutions  to  human  dilemmas  beyond 
the  impersonal  profit-maximizing  choices  of  the  market  or  the 
ultimately  elusive  if  seductive  dreams  of  technological  utopianism. 
HISTORY,  CONTINGENCY,  AND  BIOETHICS 
Just  as  the  three  principles  of  value  in  real  estate  are  location, 
location,  location,  for  history  they  are  context,  context,  and 
context.  And  irony  and  contingency  are  implicit  in  a  contextual 
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consequences.  But  in  one  respect  historians  are  more  fortunate 
than  bioethicists:  no  one  expects  them  to  solve  emergent  social 
problems.  The  bioethical  enterprise,  on  the  other  hand,  origi 
nated,  as  we  have  seen,  as  a  response  to  such  perceived  prob 
lems  and  continues  to  offer  not  just  analysis  of  but  solutions  to 
them. 
Yet  the  most  profound  of  such  problems  are,  in  their  nature, 
unsolvable.  We  are  well  aware  that  there  is no  ultimate  solution 
for  pain  and  death,  no  way  to  explain  the  brutal  randomness 
with  which  suffering  is  distributed.  These  are  aspects  of  the 
human  condition.  Some  other  issues  are  perhaps  less  obvious. 
There  is  also  no  easy  solution,  for  example,  to  the  way  inequali 
ties  of  social  identity  reenact  themselves  in medical  care.  An 
other  paradox  grows  out  of  our  natural  yet  contradictory  de 
sire  for  cure  and  care,  for  technological  efficacy  with  a  human 
face.  But  care  and  cure  are  not  easily  linked  in  one  context;  the 
historical  circumstances  that  produce  the  laboratory's  undeni 
able  achievements  also  produce  the  bureaucracy  that  intimi 
dates,  fragments,  and  distances.  A  parallel  conflict  grows  out  of 
the difference  between  interest  as defined  by  the  individual  and 
interest  as  defined  by  the  collective;  a  test  or  procedure  that  can 
benefit  one  individual  might  be  irrational  from  the  social  system 
perspective.  Ours  is  a  health-care  system,  moreover,  that  has 
consistently  demonstrated  the  ability  to  incorporate  the  criti 
cally  and  morally  oppositional  and  make  it  an  aspect  of  the 
system  itself.  And  this,  perhaps,  is  the  ultimate  irony  of  bioeth 
ics'  history:  the  persistent  yet  perhaps  illusory  quality  of  our 
desire  to  routinize  the  humane,  to  formulate  and  safeguard 
timeless  values  in  a world  of  ceaseless  change,  social  inequality, 
and  Utopian  laboratory  expectations. 
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